Abstract. We consider the problem of formal automatic verification of cryptographic protocols when some data, like poorly chosen passwords, can be guessed by dictionary attacks. First, we define a theory of these attacks and propose an inference system modeling the deduction capabilities of an intruder. This system extends a set of well-studied deduction rules for symmetric and public key encryption, often called DolevYYao rules, with the introduction of a probabilistic encryption operator and guessing abilities for the intruder. Then, we show that the intruder deduction problem in this extended model is decidable in PTIME. The proof is based on a locality lemma for our inference system. This first result yields to an NP decision procedure for the protocol insecurity problem in the presence of a passive intruder. In the active case, the same problem is proved to be NP-complete: we give a procedure for simultaneously solving symbolic constraints with variables that represent intruder deductions. We illustrate the procedure with examples of published protocols and compare our model to other recent formal definitions of dictionary attacks.
Introduction
The formal verification of cryptographic protocols in an insecure network is known to be an undecidable problem, even with strong restrictions. The undecidability results from several factors: the ability of agents to generate fresh random data (nonces), the unlimited size of terms, and the unboundedness of the number of sessions. Removing the last condition is sufficient for decidability (while removing the others is not; see Durgin et al., 1999; Comon and Cortier, 2005; Amadio and Charatonik, 2002) , and several procedures have been proposed to decide the protocol insecurity problem with a bounded number of sessions (Amadio and Lugiez, 2000; Millen and Shmatikov, 2001; Rusinowitch and Turuani, 2001) , where the problem is shown NP-complete.
In the works cited above, as well as in many other approaches concerning automated verification of security protocols, the intruder model is based on the so-called DolevYYao deduction rules for public-key encryption (Dolev and Yao, 1983) . This deduction system specifies how the attacker can obtain new information from previous knowledge, which he has obtained by silently eavesdropping the communication network (it is a passive intruder behavior) and by participating according to protocol by sending new messages, thus provoking honest participants to reply according to the protocol rules (in this latter case, the intruder has an active behavior). The deduction abilities of the intruder still comply with the perfect cryptography assumption, which states that the only way to obtain knowledge about an encrypted plaintext is to know the decryption key, and there is no way to obtain the key from ciphertexts. This abstraction happened to be accurate enough to reveal many logical attacks on known cryptographic protocols in an automated way. However, it may be too strong to capture some specific attacks that may occur in real-world situations. For instance, in the DolevYYao model it is not possible to take into account attacks based on algebraic properties of cryptographic operators, like exclusive or, in presence of which the protocol insecurity problem with a bounded number of sessions is still decidable (Comon-Lundh and Shmatikov, 2003; Chevalier et al., 2003) .
In this paper, we formalize another interesting attack technique that appears to be out of the scope of the DolevYYao model: the so-called dictionary attacks (Gong et al., 1993; Lowe, 2004) . In some situations, an intruder is able to guess poorly chosen passwords (or other data belonging to a reasonably small domain) by an offline brute-force iteration through a dictionary, using messages previously collected on the network to verify his guess at each step. The reason for the interest in this kind of attack is simple: password-guessing attacks are a common avenue for breaking into systems, and the application of formal methods to analyze password protocols can help.
The study of dictionary attacks involves a number of facets. At the beginning of the nineties, several examples of dictionary attacks were analyzed, and some countermeasures were proposed to design protocols resistant to this kind of attack (Gong et al., 1993; Gong, 1995; Tsudik and Herreweghen, 1993; Bellovin and Merritt, 1992) . Considerable effort seems to have been put into using provable security (Goldwasser and Micali, 1984) for analyzing such protocols that use poorly chosen data (Wu, 1998; Bellare et al., 2000; Katz et al., 2001 ). However, the automatic verification methods that have been used successfully for cryptographic protocol analysis were not used at this time for password protocols. Perhaps the reason rests with the complex nature of dictionary attacks, whose analysis involves complications similar to combining cryptanalytical and abstract protocol analysis. Only recently have some procedures been implemented to automatically find dictionary attacks (Lowe, 2004; Corin et al., 2003; Cohen, 2002; Blanchet, 2004) . However, neither the complexity or the completeness of the procedures nor the decidability of the problem has been studied in these works.
We propose decision procedure (and complexity) results for the decision of the security of protocols against dictionary attacks when the number of sessions is bounded. Our model of dictionary attacks is based on an inference system extending the DolevYYao rules for symmetric and public-key encryption to take into account probabilistic encryption and offline dictionary attacks. Our inference rules for dictionary attacks are semantically closed to the definition of Lowe (2004) . The first result is a locality result showing that the intruder deduction problem is PTIME. The second result concerns the case where the intruder is active. We show that the problem is NP-complete by reducing it to the problem of the satisfiability of symbolic constraint systems. Though this complexity is the same as in the DolevYYao to model, (Rusinowitch and Turuani, 2001) , the proofs of our decision procedure are made dramatically harder by the introduction of guessing abilities in the inference system. Indeed, some basic results easy to prove in the standard DolevYYao model are not basic anymore in our extended model.
Moreover, the extension of the intruder deduction model to probabilistic encryption operators is an important contribution when considering vulnerability to dictionary attacks. Indeed, this kind of encryption can be used as a countermeasure to prevent dictionary attacks.
After some motivating examples of dictionary attacks (Section 2) and preliminary definitions of protocols syntax and semantics (Section 3) we define in Section 4 our extended intruder model which formalizes in particular dictionary attacks, and we give in Section 5 decision problems (intruder deduction, trace insecurity, protocol insecurity) we are interested in. We then prove a locality result from which it follows that the intruder deduction problem protocol can be decided in polynomial time (Section 6). This yields to an NP algorithm for the trace and protocol insecurity problems in the presence of a passive intruder. In Section 7, we reduce the trace and protocol insecurity problems in the presence of an active intruder to the satisfaisability of symbolic constraint systems (where each individual constraint is a lifting of the problem defined in the passive case). We give in Section 8 a nondeterministic polynomial time procedure to decide the satisfaisability of such constraint systems. A comparison with other models based on CSP (Lowe, 2004 ) and the applied picalculus (Corin et al., 2004) can be found at the end of the paper.
A preliminary version of this work was published in Delaune and Jacquemard (2004) .
Examples
A simple subcase of dictionary attacks is the known-plaintext attacks, where an intruder intercepts a message {M} K encrypted with a weak password K and DECIDING THE SECURITY OF PROTOCOLS AGAINST DICTIONARY ATTACKS whose encrypted content M is known (for instance, an instruction like hello). The intruder can then try to decrypt this ciphertext with each word in a dictionary one by one, and verify for each guess d whether the value obtained is the known plaintext M, which means with a high probability that d = K. This method also works against a challenge-response scheme where a server sends to a user A a random number (nonce) N as a challenge and A responds with {N} K , where K is its weak password.
The examples below show that similar attacks are also possible in some cases where the plaintext is not known, with more subtle techniques to verify the guesses.
NAIVE VOTE PROTOCOL AND PROBABILISTIC ENCRYPTION
Consider the following naive vote protocol:
The voter A encrypts his vote V with the public key pub(S) of the vote server S. The server decrypts the message with his private key priv(S) and registers the vote. The security requirement is that only A and S know V. This protocol is secure if we assume strong encryption primitives: an intruder who intercepts the message {V} pub(S) will not be able to learn the vote V of A as long as he does not know priv(S). However, if we assume that the intruder knows a finite set D (reasonably small) of values that V can take, then he can deduce V without knowing priv(S): for each value d 2 D, he encrypts d with pub(S) and verifies whether the ciphertext {d} pub(S) obtained is equal to {V} pub(S) , which means that the guess d = V. Therefore, an intruder able to eavesdrop on the vote messages will be able to deduce who voted for whom.
The attack described above can be mounted only if the encryption scheme is deterministic. This means that encrypting a given message with a key always returns the same result. This is the case of encryption algorithms such as RSA and AES. To prevent such failure, in real vote protocols, the algorithms used for encryption often include random choices and therefore are probabilistic. This kind of encryption scheme was invented by Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali (Goldwasser and Micali, 1984) , and recent practical implementations have been proposed. The idea behind probabilistic encryption is roughly that the encryption algorithm relies on some random value, chosen by the agent involving encryption. It means that encrypting several times the same plaintext with the same key returns different ciphertexts. However, the decryption function will return the same plaintext from all these ciphertexts.
Let us consider the naive vote protocol based on probabilistic encryption. We model this situation by adding a third parameter to the encryption primitive, which represents the random choice performed by the agent before applying the encryption algorithm. Hence, we obtain 0: A ! S : fVg r pubðSÞ :
Assume that the attacker intercepts the ciphertext C (i.e., {V} pub(S) r ). Even if he guesses V correctly, encrypting V with the public key of S, the result will be a completely different ciphertext C 0 . He therefore cannot compare C and C 0 and so cannot know that he has guessed the message V correctly.
HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL
Consider the following challenge-response transaction, which is commonly used in authentication protocols (see Gong et al., 1993) . A generates a nonce N and sends it to B encrypted probabilistically with the symmetric key pw(A, B) (the cryptosystem is symmetric in this example). B decrypts the message, computes N + 1, and returns to A the encrypted result. In the standard DolevYYao model, an intruder who intercepts the messages cannot deduce pw(A, B), and the incrementation of N in the second message prevents replay attacks. However, if pw(A, B) is a poorly chosen password and belongs to a finite dictionary D, then the challenge-response transaction can be attacked in other ways. The intruder guesses d 2 D and tries to decrypt both messages 0 and 1 with d. He obtains two values, v 0 and v 1 respectively. If v 1 = v 0 + 1, then the attacker has guessed the correct value d = K with high probability.
This dictionary attack has been used to exploit systems in the past, often quite successfully. Note that using probabilistic encryption does not prevent the attack described above because the attack uses only the decryption algorithm, which is necessarily deterministic.
ENHANCED KERBEROS PROTOCOL
As outlined in Gong et al. (1993) , the Kerberos protocol (Steiner et al., 1988) contains some messages that make it vulnerable to known-plaintext attacks. To avoid this problem, Gong et al. (1993) propose the following modification, which we shall use as a running example. Like in Section 2.2, probabilistic encryption DECIDING THE SECURITY OF PROTOCOLS AGAINST DICTIONARY ATTACKS does not prevent the attack described below; hence, for sake of clarity, we shall use the deterministic encryption symbol with only two parameters. 0: A ! S : fA; B; N 1 ; N 2 ; Ca; fTag pwðA;SÞ g pubðSÞ 1: S ! A : fN 1 ; K È N 2 g pwðA;SÞ ; fA; K; Tsg pwðB;SÞ 2: A ! B : fA; K; Tsg pwðB;SÞ In this protocol, the user A obtains from S a secret key K to be shared between himself and the ticket-granting service B. Afterward, A can obtain tickets for other services from B using this key K. The symbol È denotes the bitwise exclusive or operation. We do not consider any algebraic properties of this operation here and rather see it as an encryption: K È N is equivalent to {K} N . pub(S) is the public key of the server S, and pw(A, S), pw(B, S) are symmetric keys (passwords) that A and B respectively share with S.
The password pw(B, S) can be assumed to be well chosen because B is a server, but the password pw(A, S) of the user A is likely to come from a dictionary. This protocol implements some protections against dictionary attacks on pw(A, S), using the nonces N 1 , N 2 , the confounder Ca (which is a long nonce whose role is to confound attacks like in Section 2.2), and the timestamps Ta and Ts, added in order to prevent the replay of messages 0 and 1. We refer the reader to Gong et al. (1993) for the details about this protocol.
As described in Tsudik and Herreweghen (1993) , Gong et al. (1993), and Lowe (2004) for similar protocols, if the server S does not record the timestamp Ta, and if the clocks of S and A are not well synchronized, an intruder can replay a copy of an eavesdropped message 0 within the clock skew, making possible the attack described in Figure 1 .
In the session , the intruder replays A's message .0, so as to get the server to issue (in .1) another message using the same nonces N 1 and N 2 . Hence, N 1 can be used as a verifier to guess pw(A, S): the intruder can decrypt {N 1 , K È N 2 } pw(A,S) and {N 1 , K 0 È N 2 } pw(A,S) with a value d chosen in a dictionary, and if Figure 1 . Description of the attack on the Kerberos protocol.
the first field of the two values obtained is the same, then the value guessed d = pw(A, S). After that, the intruder can impersonate A in a third session , with chosen nonces M 1 and M 2 , and he obtains in .1 the session key K 00 , which is assumed to be a secret shared between A, S and B.
Abstract Model for Protocols
We assume given a signature F containing the symbols b_, _À (pairing j ), {_} _ (deterministic encryption), {_} _ _ (probabilistic encryption), some unary function symbols representing invertible functions, others representing one-way functions, and three other special constructors: pw(_) (for symmetric keys, or passwords shared between agents), pub(_) (for asymmetric public keys of agents), and priv(_) (for the corresponding private keys).
The signature F contains also an arbitrary subset F 0 of constant symbols representing objects like keys, agent names, and nonces. We also assume an infinite set of variables X . The set of terms built with F and X is denoted by T ðF; XÞ and the subset of ground terms (terms without variables) T ðF Þ. We denote by vars(t) the set of variables occurring in a term t 2 T ðF; XÞ, and by st(t) the set of subterms of t. These two notations are extended as expected to a structure T containing some terms: vars(T) (resp. st(t)) is the union of the sets vars(T) (resp. st(t)) for every term t occurring in T.
We assume a linear well-founded ordering 0 on the ground terms of T ðFÞ such that the constant 0 is minimal w.r.t. 0. We shall use below the (wellfounded) extension ( of 0 to multisets of ground terms (see Dershowitz, 1987) . For the sake of notations, given two substitutions ' 1 and ' 2 , we write
Among the terms of T ðF Þ, we distinguish a finite subset G of guessable symbols such that G F 0 [ fpwðtÞ; pubðtÞ; privðtÞjt 2 T ðF Þg. These symbols all have the distinctive feature of taking their values in finite (quite small) dictionaries known by everyone. Moreover, we assume a bijective mapping denoted _ j1 from T ðF; XÞ into T ðF; XÞ which associates to a public key the corresponding private key and reciprocally. More precisely, if k 2 F 0 represents an asymmetric key, public or private, then k À1 2 F 0 represents its private (resp. public) counterpart. For every t 2 T ðF ; XÞ, we have pub(t) j1 = priv(t) and priv(t) j1 = pub(t), and for every other s 2 T ðF; XÞ (which does not represent a public or private key), we have s j1 = s. A substitution is the term morphism extension of a finite mapping {x 1 7 ! t 1 , . . . , x n 7 ! t n }, where x 1 ; . . . ; x n 2 X and t 1 ; . . . t n 2 T ðF ; XÞ. If t 1 ; . . . t n 2 T ðF Þ; the substitution is called ground. As usual, the application of a substitution ' to a term t and the composition of substitutions ' 1 by ' 2 are written in postfix j For the sake of simplicity we usually write t 1 , t 2 instead of bt 1 ,t 2 À. notation, respectively t' and ' 1 ' 2 . A substitution ' is grounding for t if t' 2 T ðF Þ. Given two terms u and v, the replacement of u by v, denoted by [u 7 ! v] , maps every term t to the term t[u 7 ! v], which is obtained by replacing all occurrences of u in t by v. Note that the result of such replacement is uniquely determined.
In the paper, jSj denotes the cardinal of the set S. The size ktk of a term t is the number of nodes in t. This notation is extended as expected to a set of terms kTk. The dag-size kT d k of a term container T is the number of distinct subterms of T (i.e., the number of nodes in a representation of T as a dag with maximal sharing). More details about the dag representations of terms can be found in Rusinowitch and Turuani (2001) .
3.1. PROTOCOL SYNTAX DEFINITION 1 (Protocol). A protocol is a finite set of programs, each program being a finite sequence of pairs of instructions of the form recvðrÞ; sendðsÞ with r; s 2 T ðF; XÞ.
It is semantically equivalent to consider programs which are sequences of send and recv in an arbitrary order, since we may add some instructions sendð0Þ and recvð0Þ, where 0 2 F 0 n G is a special constant known to everyone.
The formalism used here to model protocols is close to so-called strand spaces (Thayer et al., 1999) and is sufficiently general to describe a lot of protocols. Like the strand space model, however, it suffers from some drawbacks. For instance, it does not permit one to model an agent who receives a ciphertext and who later verifies after he receives the decryption key. EXAMPLE 1 (Kerberos protocol). The Kerberos protocol variant described in Section 2.3 is made of three programs:
pwðB;SÞ
Þ; sendð0Þ
The symbols x A i . . . (i = 0, 1, 2) are distinct variables of X . Note that A receives (in step 1) the ciphertext {A, K, Ts} pw(B, S) as a value x 0 and forwards it blindly (to B), since he does not know B's password pw(B, S). The program of role B implements only the reception of the last message by B.
PROTOCOL SEMANTICS
DEFINITION 2 (Process). Given a protocol P, a process (p, ') following P is made of a program p 2 P and a ground substitution ' whose domain is a subset of vars( p).
Every program of the protocol P defines a role, and a process (p, ') is an honest agent playing the role p. A configuration is a pair (S, N) where S is a finite set of processes whose programs have disjoint sets of variables, and N is a set of ground terms representing the messages currently in the network (the message sent and not yet received).
We define operational semantics for the execution of processes. Each step changes the running configuration, denoted ðS; NÞ * i ðS 0 ; N 0 Þ for some 0 e i < jSj, if the ith process of S is (p, ') with p ¼ recvðrÞ; sendðsÞ; p 0 and Y the instruction recvðrÞ is executed properly, that is, there exists a ground substitution such that r' 2 N, S 0 is obtained from S by updating the ith process to ( p 0 , ' 0 ), where ' 0 = ', and leaving the other process unchanged, and the message r is later removed from the network;
Y the instruction sendðsÞ is executed, by adding the term s'
We assume that the protocol and the initial configuration are such that after every such step, s' 0 is ground. Hence, the messages sent are built from values completely defined by the previous steps of the protocol and the initial knowledge of the processes. More formally, we have the following definition.
0 ) of a protocol P is called runnable iff for each i e m such that the program p i is the sequence ðrecvðr i; j Þ; sendðs i; j ÞÞ j n , for each j e n, we have
EXAMPLE 2 (Kerberos protocol). The set of processes ((p 0 , ' 0 ), (p 1 , ' 1 ), (p 2 , ' 2 )) described below is the first component of a runnable initial configuration of the protocol of Example 1 
DECIDING THE SECURITY OF PROTOCOLS AGAINST DICTIONARY ATTACKS
In this paper, we are interested in proving the reachability (from a given runnable initial configuration) of a configuration where some security property is compromised, assuming the presence of an intruder who has some control over the communication network, as defined in the next section.
Intruder Model
We consider now an intruder with some control over the communication network. He is able to read any message in the network and to analyze the messages read in order to deduce new messages, using some inference rules like the ones defined in Subsections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. When the abilities of the intruder are limited to the two former actions, we call him a passive intruder. The problems of the complexity of intruder deduction, as well as protocol verification in the presence of a passive intruder with guessing abilities, are studied in Section 6.
The intruder can also be assumed to be able to send new messages to the network: he is then called an active intruder. The verification of protocol insecurity in the presence of an active intruder is studied in Sections 7 and 8.
We shall give more formal definitions of passive and active intruders in Section 4.6.
DOLEVYYAO DEDUCTION MODEL
The most widely used deduction relation representing the analysis abilities of an intruder is often refereed as the DolevYYao model after Dolev and Yao (1983) , though the formalism of this paper is not exactly the same as the one used here. It is denoted by a Bsequent^T ï u (the intruder is able to deduce the term u 2 T ðFÞ from the finite set of terms T T ðF Þ), and is defined by the inference rules in Figure 2 .
In this model, the intruder can form pairs and ciphertexts from known terms (rules P; E), decompose pairs (rules UL; UR), and decrypt ciphertexts, provided that he can deduce the decryption key (rules D). The latter condition is known as the perfect cryptography assumption. 
PROBABILISTIC ENCRYPTION
We have seen the importance of the probabilistic encryption primitive in the context of dictionary attacks (see Section 2.1). We propose here an extension of the above DolevYYao model by adding two inference rules, described in Figure  3 , to deal with probabilistic encryption. The rule ðEpÞ says that the intruder can form a ciphertext from a known term (plaintext) u, and a random value r. The ciphertext depends on the input r. The rule ðDpÞ does not depend on the random input r: a decryption algorithm is necessarily deterministic.
The DolevYYao model of Section 4.1 extended with the two inference rules displayed in Figure 3 is called the DolevYYao model with probabilistic encryption.
GUESSING MODEL
We now describe how dictionary attacks can be modeled as an extension of the above DolevYYao model. For this purpose, we refer to the following definition of dictionary attacks from Lowe (2004) that claims to generalize the definition of Gong et al. (1993) :
A dictionary attack consists of the intruder's guessing a value d and then verifying it. The verification will be by the intruder using d to produce a value v, which we call the verifier and can take a number of different forms:
1. the intruder knew v initially, (see Section 2.1) 2. the intruder produced v in two distinct ways from d, (see Section 2.2) 3. v is an asymmetric key, and the intruder knows v's inverse from somewhere.
Intuitively, the intruder knows that g 2 G belongs to a dictionary, in which he picks d. If the verifier v, built with d and the intruder's knowledge, ensures one of the three conditions above, then the probability is high that d = g. We use a variant of the rules of Figure 2 in order to model the guessing of a d and the production of a verifier v 2 T ðF Þ by the intruder. In the rules of this variant, presented in Figure 4 , we introduce a new form of sequent T/T 0 ï 0 v, which means that if the intruder knows the messages in T T ðF Þ and guessed values for the symbols of T 0 G, then he can build the verifier v 2 T ðF Þ. In other words, he can deduce that v belongs to a finite set that he can compute. The members of T and T 0 are respectively called the strong and weak hypotheses of T/T 0 ï 0 v, and v is called its target. Figure 5 introduces a deduction rule Compare, which models the verification of a guess d with one of the three cases described above. The conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that one of the proofs P 1 or P 2 really uses the guessable value g and is necessary to prevent certain false attacks (see Section 4.5). The normality condition (ii) prohibits deduction steps that simply undo previous steps. It refers to the notion of a normal DY'-proof, which is formally defined in Section 4.4. Lastly, (iii) ensures that the two proofs P 1 and P 2 do not end with the same instance of the same rule. Hence, the two ways to obtain the verifier v are really distinct.
The inference system made of the rules displayed in Figures 
PROOF TREES DEFINITION 4 (Proof
Y every leaf of P is labeled with some v 2 T (resp. v 2 T [ G); Y for every node n labeled with s with k sons labeled with s 1 ,. . ., s k , (s 1 ,. . .,
is an instance of an inference rule R of Figures 2 and 3 (resp. Figure 4) , where s 1 ,. . ., s k are the premises and s the conclusion. We say that P contains the instance (s 1 ,. . ., s k , s) or ends with this instance (or simply with rule R) if n is the root of P, Y the root is labeled with some T ï u (resp. T/T 0 ï 0 u).
A guessing-proof is a tree ending with an instance of the rule Compare and whose two sons are DY'-proofs that satisfy the conditions (1)Y(4) of Figure 5 .
Let P be a DY-proof (resp. DY'-proof). We say that the pair bu 1 , u 2 À is decomposed in P if P contains an instance of the rule ðULÞ or ðURÞ (resp. ðUL 0 Þ or ðUR 0 Þ) whose target of the premise is bu 1 , u 2 À. Similarly, the ciphertext fu 1 g fu 2 g (resp. fu 1 g
) is said to be decomposed in P if P contains an instance of the rule ðDÞ or ðD 0 Þ (resp. ðDpÞ or ðDp 0 ÞÞ whose targets of premises are fu 1 g u 2 and u 2
, u 2 j1 and u 3 ).
DEFINITION 5 (Minimality). A DY-proof or DY'-proof P is called minimal if it does not contain two nodes on the same path labeled by sequents with the same target.
The following notion of normal proof is used in the definition of the rule Compare.
DEFINITION 6 (Normality). A DY'-proof P is called normal if the rewrite rules defined in Figure 6 cannot be applied to P.
The normality of DY-proofs is defined with a similar set of rewrite rules, where ðD 0 ; E 0 ; P 0 ; UL 0 ; UR 0 ; Dp 0 ; Ep 0 Þ are replaced respectively by ðD; E; P; UL; UR; Dp; EpÞ.
The rewrite rules of Figure 6 correspond to algebraic properties of the operators. For instance, the first rule expresses that the composition of encryption and decryption (with the keys of the same keypair) is the identity. The third rewrite rule states that this is also the case of the composition of decryption and deterministic encryption. To be more precise, the rewrite rules described in Figure 6 are used to model the algebraic properties listed below. The pairing, the left, and right projection operators are respectively denoted P, UL, and UR. The encryption and decryption operators and their probabilistic counterparts are respectively denoted E, D, Ep, and Dp. returns u 1 , the probabilistic , with r 0 m r, and hence this ciphertext differs from the original one. In the setting of dictionary attacks, it is crucial to be able to find proofs that are not equivalent modulo these rewrite rules, as explained in Section 4.5.
Note that every minimal DY'-proof is normal. Indeed, every left member of rewrite rule of Figure 6 contains two nodes on the same path labeled by sequents with the same target (but not necessarily with the same set of weak hypotheses). LEMMA 1. If there exists a DY-proof of T ï u, then there exists a minimal DYproof of T ï u.
Proof. We can show this result by induction on the proof P of T ï u. If P is reduced to an instance of the rule ðAÞ, then it is obvious. Otherwise, by the induction hypothesis the direct subproofs of P are minimal. So, if P is not minimal, there exist two nodes on the same path labeled by the sequent T ï u. One of these is the root of P. Hence, the other is the root of a minimal proof of T ï u.
Ì
This result is not valid for DY'-proofs, however, unless the set of weak hypotheses is empty for every node. The problem with DY'-proofs is that we cannot assume that two nodes on the same path and with the same target have the same set of weak hypotheses.
RULE COMPARE
In this section, we explain in more detail the conditions of application of the rule Compare. We also provide examples to illustrate this rule.
Condition (ii).
By condition (i), one son P 1 or P 2 contains the guess g among the weak hypotheses, but it is not sufficient to ensure that P 1 or P 2 really depends on the guess g: only condition (ii) ensures this property. Indeed, without this condition, there would be a guessing-proof with the two (nonnormal) sons below, which would mean that the intruder is able to guess any g 2 G from any message m known by the intruder.
The idea behind condition (ii) is that in a proof like the one above, reobtaining the value m after the successive applications of pairing ðP 0 Þ and projection ðUL 0 Þ is not a commitment that the guess of g is correct. It is just an algebraic property of the operators, characterized by a rewrite rule of Figure 6 . Condition (iii). Condition (iii) also prevents certain false attacks. Consider a program that is made up of one pair of instructions recvðxÞ; sendðhx; xiÞ. An agent executing this program will answer to any message m with the pair bm, mÀ. Thus, if the intruder knows the message m = {n} g r , he obtains from the agent the answer
The two DY'-proofs below verify conditions (i), (ii), and (iv) of the rule Compare. Condition (iii) is not verified, however, and these two proofs indeed represent a fake dictionary attack. Intuitively, in this attack, the intruder guesses a value d for g, computes the left and right projections ððUL 0 Þ and ðUR 0 ÞÞ of m, tries to decrypt each projection with d (rule ðDp 0 Þ), and compares the values obtained. But, since both projections are {n} g r , the values will always be equal, even when d m g. We see that the two proofs differ (the first step is left or right projection) but that their last instance is the same (decryption applied to the same premises).
Note that if the two ciphertexts of the pair had been obtained by two distinct applications of the probabilistic encryption algorithm, we would have obtained a pair that is composed of two distinct terms, that is, hfng r g ; fng r 0 g i, allowing the intruder to mount a dictionary attack.
We illustrate the application of the rule Compare on the protocols given in Section 2. EXAMPLE 3 (Naive vote protocol). Let T = {{V} pub(S) , pub(S)} and G ¼ fVg.
The following guessing-proof models the guessing attack performed by the intruder on V: 
PASSIVE AND ACTIVE INTRUDER
A ground term u 2 T ðF Þ is called deducible from a set of ground terms N T ðFÞ if and only if there exist a finite subset T of N and a DY-proof of T ï u. We note ded(N) the set of ground terms deducible from N.
To define the transition performed by the intruder, we extend the configurations of the system with a third component representing the intruder's knowledge. Therefore, a configuration is a triple (S, N, K), where S and N are as in Section 3.2 and K T ðF Þ. The transitions of the intruder, denoted +, are defined as follows.
We define a passive intruder as capable of performing the transitions listen and deduce and an active intruder as capable of performing the two latter transitions and moreover write and divert.
We define the relation + g, for g 2 G, by (S, N, K) + g (S, N, K ? {g}), if and only if there exist a finite subset T of K and a guessing-proof of T ï g.
Security Problems
The first problem we are interested in is the so-called intruder deduction problem. Y the selection of the process who is going to proceed; and Y the choice, by the intruder, of a value that he will be trying to guess offline, and when he makes the offline dictionary attack.
The following definition of interleavings is a characterization of these two choices.
DEFINITION 8 (Interleaving). Given an initial configuration S ¼ ðfðp 0 ; ' 0 Þ; . . . ; ðp m ; ' m Þg; N 0 Þ of a protocol P, an interleaving of S is a finite sequence I of values that can be either terms of G or integers in 0 . . . m (indices of processes of S) such that the number of occurrences of every index i in I is smaller than or equal to the number of instruction pairs in p i .
Hence, an interleaving defines a scenario for processes execution and intruder guessing in a potential attack. The problem of trace insecurity consists in deciding whether such a scenario can be directed by the intruder and whether, when following this scenario, the system reaches a critical state.
We define the relation Y i on configurations, for an integer i, by Y i := +* * i , +* (+* denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of +, and * i is extended to triples as expected), and we define the relation Y g , for g 2 G, by Y g := +* + g +*.
The relation Y I , for an interleaving I, is defined recursively as follows: Y ; is the identity, Y I,i := Y I Y i for an integer i (I, i denotes the interleaving obtained by appending i to I) and Y I,g := Y I Y g for g 2 G.
DEFINITION 9 (Trace Insecurity problem (TI)). IN: a protocol P, a runnable initial configuration (S 0 , N 0 ) of P, a finite set K 0 & T ðFÞ (the initial knowledge of the intruder), an interleaving I of (S 0 , N 0 ), and a ground term s 2 T ðF Þ. OUT: Does there exists (S, N, K) such that (S 0 , N 0 , K 0 ) Y I (S, N, K) and s is deducible from K?
We study in Section 6 the case of a passive intruder. In particular, we prove that the intruder deduction problem is decidable in PTIME. This yields to an NP decision procedure for the trace insecurity problem in the presence of a passive intruder. Sections 7 and 8 are devoted to prove that the trace insecurity problem is NP-complete when the intruder is active. REMARK 1. For the sake of simplicity, the signature F and the set G of guessable terms are assumed fixed; hence their size is a constant in the complexity results below. However, the complexity results would remain the same if G were part of the input of the problem.
We can express several trace properties of protocols as instances of (TI), for example, failure of authentication (one process p completes the protocol presumably with an interlocutor p 0 whereas p 0 did not even start to run, and hence p has been fooled into communicating only with the intruder), or confidentiality.
The problem of the existence of an interleaving I, given P, G, (S 0 , N 0 ), K 0 and s as above, returning a positive answer to (TI) is sometimes called Protocol Insecurity (PI) in the literature. The number of processes and their size are bounded by kS 0 k, and hence the length of every possible interleaving is polynomially bounded in this measure. Therefore, a consequence of the results of Sections 6Y8 is that (PI) is decidable in NP in presence of a passive or active intruder.
Decision Procedures in the Presence of a Passive Intruder
When the intruder is passive, the only messages circulating over the network are sent by the protocol participants (the processes). Given a protocol P, an initial configuration (S 0 , N 0 ), and an interleaving I, the set T of messages known by the intruder at the end is bounded and can be computed in advance (in nondeterministic polynomial time). Therefore, in this case, the trace insecurity problem (w.r.t. P, (S 0 , N 0 ), I, and some K 0 & T ðF Þ and s 2 T ðF Þ) is reducible to the existence of one DY-proof and some guessing-proofs. The complexity of the decision of the existence of (DY, DY', guessing) proofs is given in Section 6.2. Then, we give complexity results for the problems (ID, TI, PI) presented in Section 5 for the case of a passive intruder. These latter results are based on technical lemmas proved in Section 6.1.
LOCALITY
The notion of locality was coined by McAllester (McAllester, 1993) to characterize theories with a deduction problem decidable in polynomial time. We follow a similar approach and prove below three locality results for, respectively, the DolevYYao and DolevYYao' model with probabilistic encryption, and the guessing model.
The proposition 1 is a locality result for DY-proofs. PROPOSITION 1. A normal DY-proof P of T ï u contains only terms in st(T ? {u}). If, moreover, P ends with a decomposition rule ðA; UL; UR; D; DpÞ, then P contains only terms in st(T).
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Proof. We prove the following results simultaneously by induction on the proof P of T ï u:
1. P contains only terms in st(T ? {u}), 2. If the last inference rule of P is a decomposition rule ðA; UL; UR; D; DpÞ, then P contains only terms in st(T).
We consider all possible cases for the last inference rule:
Y rule ðAÞ; the result is straightforward. Y rule ðEÞ; then u ¼ fu 1 g u 2 . By the induction hypothesis (1), the proof P i (i = 1, 2) of T ï u i contains only terms in st(T ? {u i }). So the proof, which consists of applying the rule ðEÞ on the proofs P 1 and P 2 , contains only terms in st(T ? {u}).
Y rule ðPÞ and ðEpÞ, it is similar to ðEÞ. Y rule ðULÞ, then we have a normal DY-proof P 1 of T ï bu, vÀ for which the last inference rule is necessarily a decomposition rule by normality of the proof P. By the induction hypothesis (2), P 1 contains only terms in st(T).
Hence bu, vÀ 2 st(T), and we deduce that P contains only terms in st(T).
Y rule ðURÞ; it is similar to ðULÞ. Y rule ðDpÞ; then we have the following derivation:
We consider the last inference rule of P 1 . This rule is necessarily ðA; UL; UR; D; DpÞ. ðEpÞ is impossible by normality of P. Now, we apply the induction hypothesis (2) and obtain that P 1 involves only terms in st(T). We distinguish two possible cases. First, if k is a symmetric key, then k j1 = k. By the induction hypothesis, P 2 involves only terms in st(T ? {k}), and we have k 2 st(T). So, P involves only terms in st(T). Second, if k is an asymmetric key, then k À1 2 F 0 [ fpubðtÞ; privðtÞjt 2 T ðF Þg. Consider the last inference rule of P 2 . This rule is necessarily ðA; UL; UR; D; DpÞ. By the induction hypothesis, P 2 involves only terms in st(T). So P involves only terms in st(T).
Y rule ðDÞ; it is similar to ðDpÞ. Ì
The proof of Proposition 1 can be straightforwardly extended to the following analogous locality result for the DY'-proofs. Proof. A guessing-proof is made up of two normal DY'-proofs P 1 of T/T 1 0 ï 0 u 1 and P 2 of T/T 2 0 ï 0 u 2 . We distinguish two cases: Y u 1 is an asymmetric key and u 2 its inverse (u 2 = u 1 j1 ) In this case, u 1 ; u 2 2 F 0 [ fpubðtÞ; privðtÞjt 2 T ðF Þg, and the last inference rule of P 1 (and P 2 ) is ðG; A 0 ; UL 0 ; UR 0 ; D 0 ; Dp 0 Þ. By Proposition 2, P 1 (resp. P 2 ) involves only terms in st(T ? T 1 0 ) (resp. st(T ? T 2 0 )), and we deduce that P involves only terms in stðT [ GÞ.
Ì
This result allows us to consider only subterms of the attacker's knowledge as potential verifiers to do a dictionary attack.
DECIDABILITY AND COMPLEXITY
We show now (see Theorem 1 and Corollary 1) that when the intruder is passive, the intruder deduction problem and the trace insecurity problem (w.r.t. P, (S 0 , N 0 ), I, K 0 & T ðF Þ and s 2 T ðF Þ) can be decided by reduction to the existence of one DY-proof, for the deducibility of s (solved in Proposition 4), and several guessing-proofs (solved in Proposition 5).
PROPOSITION 4. Given a set of messages T T ðF Þ and a message u 2 T ðFÞ, the existence of a DY-proof of T ï u can be decided in polynomial time in kT ? {u}k d .
Proof. This result follows from Lemma 1, which guarantees the existence of a minimal (hence normal) DY-proof P of T ï u, and Proposition 1, which says that P involves only terms in st(T ? {u}). Indeed, to decide the existence of such a DY-proof, we construct (following McAllester, 1993) , the set S of ground Horn clauses described in Figure 7 , which implements a marking of every ground subterms t 2 st(T ? {u}) such that there exists a proof of T ï t. Therefore, the existence of a proof of T ï u is equivalent to the nonsatisfiability of S, hence to the nonsatisfiability of a set of proposition Horn clauses (HORN-SAT) whose size is polynomial in kT ? {u}k d . Hence, the existence of a DY-proof of T ï u can be decided in linear time in the size of S, that is, in polynomial time in kT ? uk d .
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PROPOSITION 5. Given a set of messages T T ðF Þ, and a guessable symbol g 2 G, the existence of a guessing-proof of T ï g can be decided in polynomial time in kT [ Gk d .
Proof. Like in the above proof of Proposition 4, we reduce the problem with the construction of a set of ground Horn clauses S 0 . To code the instances of the rule Compare with its conditions of application, however, we need to add some additional information into the atoms of the clauses.
Given a set of messages T T ðF Þ and a guessable symbol g 2 G, we describe in Figure 8 a set S 0 of ground Horn clauses from which one can derive the empty clause if and only if there exists a (normal) guessing-proof of T ï g. Since the size of S 0 is polynomial is kT [ Gk d , this provides a decision procedure with the complexity wanted. The clauses of S 0 are built with two binary predicates I 0 and I 1 . The ground terms occurring in the first arguments of atoms are elements of stðT; GÞ, and in the second argument, one of the nullary symbols A, P, E, Ep, G corresponding to rules of the system of Figure 4 , or UL(u), UR(u), D(u), Dp(u, v) with u; v 2 stðT; GÞ. The meaning of I 0 (u, l) is that there exists a normal DY'-proof whose root is labeled with T/T 0 ï 0 u, with T 0 G. Moreover, if l is A, P, E, Ep, or G, then the proof ends by the corresponding inference rule, and if l = UL(v), then the proof has the following form (and similarly if l = UR(v) or if l = Dp(k, r)).
. . .
This second argument l is used to ensure conditions (ii) and (iii) of the rule Compare. The meaning of I 1 (u, l) is the same as I 0 (u, l) except that g 2 T 0 . Ì
The measure kGk d in Proposition 5 should not be confused with the size of the dictionary. Indeed, recall that G is the set of guessable symbols, each of which is assume to belong to a finite dictionary. Therefore, jGj is rather the number of (finite) dictionaries. Proof. Let P, (S 0 , N 0 ), K 0 , I, and s 2 T ðF Þ be an instance of (TI). First, we have to choose which message (among those currently in the network) is read by the current protocol rule. It is the nondeterministic part of the algorithm. Then, we have to verify that the chosen message matches the message expected by the agents and also that the secret s is deducible by the intruder by using all the messages previously gathered. These verifications can both be performed in polynomial time (Theorem 1). Ì COROLLARY 2. Protocol Insecurity (PI) is decidable in nondeterministic polynomial time when the intruder is passive.
Proof. The complexity result follows from the facts that the length of every possible interleaving is polynomially bounded in the size of the problem, and we have an NP decision procedure for solving the trace insecurity problem.
Ì
Note that the above three complexity results are independent from the concrete size of the dictionary. This is not surprising because we are interested in the complexity of the decision of the theoretical existence of a guessing attack rather than the cost of mounting such an attack.
Decision Procedures in the Presence of an Active Intruder
When the intruder is active, the situation is much more complicated than in Section 6. Indeed, in this case, the messages circulating over the network are sent either by the protocol participants (the processes) or by the intruder. Therefore, they cannot be computed in advance and will be represented by terms with variables. More precisely, (TI) is reduced to a problem of symbolic constraint solving. An effective constraint-solving procedure is presented in Section 8.
SYMBOLIC CONSTRAINTS
DEFINITION 10 (Constraint, solution). A constraint is a sequent of the form T í dy u (DY-constraint) or T í g u (guess-constraint), where T is a finite subset of T ðF; XÞ and u 2 T ðF; XÞ. A solution of a finite set (or system) C of constraints is a grounding substitution ' such that for every T j ' dy u 2 C (resp. every T j ' g u 2 C) there exists a DY-proof (resp. guessing-proof) of T' ï u'.
Note that we do not assume that the constraints of the set C are variable disjoint.
DEFINITION 11 (Well-formed). A finite set C of constraints is well-formed if its elements can be ordered as T 0 í x 0 r 0 , . . ., T l í x l r l such that the following conditions holds:
Y for all i e l, for all x 2 vars(T i ), there exists j < i such that x 2 vars(r j ).
REDUCTION OF (TI) TO CONSTRAINT SOLVING
Let % be an instance of (TI) made of a protocol P, a runnable initial configuration (S 0 , N 0 ), a set K 0 & T ðF Þ, an interleaving I of length ', and a secret term s s 2 T ðF Þ. We associate to this input a set Cð%Þ ¼ fC 0 ; . . . ; C ' g of DY-and guess-constraints the solvability of which is equivalent to the problem of protocol insecurity in presence of an active intruder. We construct in parallel the constraints of Cð%Þ and the sequences T 0 ; . . . ; T ' of their hypotheses sets. Let T 0 = N 0 ? K 0 . For each k < ', if I k 2 G, then C k := T k í g g (the intruder can deduce g by guessing) and T k+ 1 := T k ? {g} (he adds this value to his knowledge), Otherwise I k is an index representing a process, say, ( p, '). Let j be the number of instances of this index in I 0 I 1 . . . I kj1 , and let recvðrÞ; sendðsÞ be the jth instruction pair of the program p. Then C k := T k í dy r' (r' can be received from the network) and T k+1 := T k ? {s'} (s' is sent to the network).
EXAMPLE 5 (Kerberos protocol). The attack described in Section 2.3 can be executed starting with a (runnable) initial configuration (S 0 , ;), where S 0 contains five processes, (p i , ' i ) with i 2 {0, 1, 4, 7, 8} and with the initial intruder's knowledge
The processes p 0 , p 1 correspond to the respective roles A and S of session , described in Example 2, the process p 4 to the role S of session , and the other processes p 7 and p 8 to the role S and B of session , with
Ts 7 ! Ts 0 ;
x 4 S 7 ! S; x 4 pubðSÞ 7 ! pubðSÞ
Ts 7 ! Ts 00 ; The steps .0, .0 and .2 do not occur in I because they are performed by the intruder (on behalf of A) in the attack. The step (8, 0) (reception of last message by B) has no corresponding label. The associated constraint system C is described in Figure 9 .
LEMMA 2. For every instance % of (TI), the size of Cð%Þ is polynomial in the size of %.
LEMMA 3. For every instance % of (TI), the set of constraints Cð%Þ is wellformed. Proof. By the construction of Cð%Þ and the hypothesis that the initial configuration (S 0 , N 0 ) in % is runnable (Definition 3).
Ì

MAIN RESULTS
We give in the next section a resolution procedure for the problem of satisfiability of a set of constraints, showing the following theorem.
THEOREM 2. Given a finite well-formed set C of constraints and a set G of guessable symbols, the existence of a solution is decidable in nondeterministic polynomial time in C and G.
COROLLARY 3. Trace Insecurity (TI) is NP-complete when the intruder is active.
Proof. The NP part follows from the above polynomial construction of set of constraints associated to instances of (TI) (Lemmas 2 and 3) and from Theorem 2.
Concerning the NP-hardness, if we choose G ¼ ;, then we fall into the trace insecurity problem in presence of a standard active attacker (without guessing abilities). This problem can be shown NP-hard by a reduction from 3-SAT. Indeed, the reduction given by Rusinowitch and Turuani (2001) can easily be adapted in order to obtain a protocol with only one process. It allows one to remove the choice of the interleaving and hence to obtain a reduction from 3-SAT to the trace insecurity problem. Ì COROLLARY 4. Protocol Insecurity (PI) is NP-complete when the intruder is active.
Proof. The NP part follows from the facts that the length of every possible interleaving is polynomially bounded in the size of the problem, and we have an NP decision procedure for solving the trace insecurity problem.
Concerning the NP-hardness, if we choose G ¼ ;, then we fall into the problem of Rusinowitch and Turuani (2001) , which has been shown NP-hard.
Ì
Constraint-Solving Procedure
We present in this section a nondeterministic polynomial time algorithm to decide the satisfiability of a well-formed set of DY-and guess-constraints. The idea is that if there exists a solution, then there exists a minimal one whose dagsize is polynomial in the size of the system. This fact has been shown in Rusinowitch and Turuani (2001) for the verification of protocols in the DolevYYao model and we can use it to treat DY-constraints. The case of guess-constraints is much more difficult, however, because some results that are obvious for DY-proofs are not true for DY'-proofs (see Section 4.4). Indeed, we have shown that we can always assume that a DY-proof is in normal form, and we often use this result, but the transformation rules to normalize a DY'-proof of T/T 0 ï 0 u must be used carefully because we can lose weak hypotheses in T 0 when we apply them. Moreover, a guessing-proof ends with an instance of the rule Compare, which is inherently difficult.
ALGORITHM
The following nondeterministic decision algorithm takes as input a finite wellformed set C of DY-and guess-constraints and checks the existence of a solution. Let fx 1 ; . . . ; x m g ¼ varsðCÞ.
1. Choose for each i e m a term t i 2 stðCÞ, and let ' be a most general unifier (if any) of the equational problem E ¼ fx 1 % t 1 ; . . . ; x m % t m g, 2. If ' is ground, check whether ' is a solution of C.
If the answer of 2 is positive for some choices of 1, answer Yes. Otherwise, answer No.
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EXAMPLE 6 (Kerberos protocol). We consider the set of constraints C described in Figure 9 . At the first step of the algorithm, we build the following equational problem E.
Ts % Ts 00 :
Let ' be the most general unifier of E. Now, we can check that ' is a solution of C, that is, there exists a DY-proof of C i ' for each i 2 {0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6} and also a guessing-proof of C 3 '.
For instance, the required guessing-proof can be obtained by applying the rule Compare to the two DY'-proofs below.
ðA 0 Þ pwðA; SÞ 2 G T 3 '=pwðA; SÞ ' 0 pwðA; SÞ ðGÞ
T 3 '=; ' 0 fN 1 ; K 0 È N 2 g pwðA;SÞ ðA 0 Þ pwðA; SÞ 2 G T 3 '=pwðA; SÞ ' 0 pwðA; SÞ ðGÞ
By construction, kEk jvarsðCÞj:M, where M is the maximal size of a term in C. At step 1, the mgu ' (represented as a dag) can be computed in polynomial time in kEk, using syntactic transformation rules for solving unification problems; see, for example, (Jouannaud and Kirchner, 1991) . The dag-size of the terms in the codomain of ' is polynomial in the size of E, hence in the size of C. The test of step 2 consists in checking that each constraint of C is satisfied by '. By construction of C and according to the above bound on the size of ', the instance of any constraint of C by ' has a dagYsize polynomial in the size of C. The results of Propositions 4 and 5 yield polynomial procedures for checking the satisfaction of each constraint of C by '. Altogether, the complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in the sizes of G and C.
COMPLETENESS
The completeness of our algorithm is ensured by Corollary 5 of the key proposition 6. Technical lemmas 4, 5, and 6 will be used in the proof of this proposition. Given a proof P of a sequent T ï u, the aim of Lemmas 4 and 6 is to ensure the existence of a particular proof of T ï u that respects some extra conditions in order to guarantee some results when we are going to apply transformations, as replacement, on proof trees.
Lemma 4, has been proved in Rusinowitch and Turuani (2001) for a slightly less general model than the one we have presented here, roughly, the DY-model without probabilistic encryption. Despite this slight difference in models, the proof of Rusinowitch and Turuani (2001) can be translated in a straightforward way to prove the following lemma.
LEMMA 4. Let P be a DY-proof of T ï t and P 0 be a minimal DY-proof of T ï ending with a composition rule ðE; Ep or PÞ. There exists a proof of T ï t in which is never decomposed.
One may observe that in a guessing-proof of T ï g, the only relevant information in the weak hypotheses T 0 of a node T/T 0 ï 0 t is whether T 0 contains g. Below, in order to simplify the notations, the weak hypotheses in DY'-proofs will be noted g + , g j , or ;: g + and g j represent arbitrary subsets of G respectively containing g and not containing g. Although ;, is a subcase of g j , we still use this notation to emphasize that every DY'-proof of T / ; ï 0 u is isomorphic a DYproof of T ï u. Note that a set of guessing-proofs defined with the g + and g j notation can be represented by a unique guessing-proof, whose real contents of weak hypotheses are deduced from the leaves. Lemma 6 is analogous to Lemma 4 for guessing-proofs. Its proof requires the following auxiliary Lemma 5, which gives us sufficient conditions to have a guessing-proof of a given sequent T ï g.
LEMMA 5. Let P 1 and P 2 be two normal DY'-proofs of T/; ï 0 t and T/g + ï 0 t, respectively. There exist two DY'-proofs P 1 0 and P 2 0 , subtrees of P 1 and P 2 , respectively, and a guessing-proof of T ï g whose two sons are P 1 0 and P 2 0 . Proof. We prove this result by induction on the proof P 2 . If the proof P 2 is an instance of ðGÞ, then we can apply the rule Compare because conditions (i), (ii), and (iv) are clearly verified, and (iii) also because the proof P 1 of T/; ï 0 t cannot end with an instance of ðGÞ.
If the last rule of P 2 is ðUL 0 Þ, then the conditions (i), (ii), and (iv) of Compare are clearly met. Either the proofs P 1 and P 2 verify condition (iii) and we can apply the rule Compare, or these proofs end respectively by the instances (T/; ï 0 bt 1 , t 2 À, T/; ï 0 t 1 ) and (T/g + ï 0 bt 1 , t 2 À, T/g + ï 0 t 1 ) of ðUL 0 Þ. In such a case we apply the induction hypotheses on the subtrees of P 1 and P 2 , whose roots are labeled with T/; ï 0 bt 1 , t 2 À and T / g + ï 0 t 1 , respectively. The other cases, ðUR 0 ; P 0 ; D 0 ; Dp 0 ; E 0 ; Ep 0 Þ are similar.
Ì
In Lemma 6, equivalent of Lemma 4 for the guessing-proofs, we impose an extra condition (condition b) to ensure that the replacement we are going to perform on a such guessing-proof does not lose the only relevant information in the weak hypothesis set.
LEMMA 6. Let P be a guessing-proof of T ï g and P 0 a minimal DY'-proof of T/; ï 0 ending with a composition rule ðE 0 ; Ep 0 or P 0 Þ. There exists a guessingproof of T ï g in which
Proof. (For the sake of readability, a part of the proof has been moved to Appendix)
We make an induction on the number of instances of rules in P that do not satisfy (a) or (b). First, we consider the case of an instance that does not satisfy the condition (a), and we distinguish two subcases, depending on whether a premise of the instance is labeled with T/g + ï 0 or T/g j ï 0 . Let = b 1 , 2 À (the other cases ¼ f 1 g 2 and ¼ f 1 g 3 2 are similar).
Case (a + ): Let (T / g + ï 0 , s) be an instance of ðUL 0 Þ (the case ðUR 0 Þ is similar) in P that does not satisfy the condition (a), and let P 1 the subproof of P whose root is the above T/g + ï 0 . We can apply the induction hypothesis to the guessing-proof P 00 of T ï g whose direct subproofs are P 1 and P 0 .
Case (a j ): Let P 1 and P 2 be the two direct (DY'-) subproofs of P. Let (T/g j ï 0 , s), be an instance of ðUL 0 Þ (the case ðUR 0 Þ is similar) in P i (say i = 1 for simplicity) that does not satisfy (a), and let P 1 0 be the tree obtained from P 1 by replacing the subproof of P 1 whose root is the above T/g j ï 0 by P 0 (whose root is T/; ï 0 ). This tree P 1 0 is a DY'-proof because ; is a subcase of g j in our notation. It is not normal, and hence the condition (ii) of Compare is not satisfied by P 1 0 . We normalize the proof P 1 0 using simplification rules and show by induction on the number of simplification steps (using Lemma 5) that we obtain a guessing-proof P 00 to which we can apply the induction hypothesis. The simplification rules and the detailed induction proof can be found in Appendix.
) be an instance of the composition rule (P 0 ) in P which does not satisfy (b). Hence, we have a normal DY'-proof
and we can apply Lemma 5 to P 0 and P 1 0 in order to obtain a guessing-proof P 00 of T ï g on which we apply the induction hypothesis. Ì PROPOSITION 6. Let ' be a minimal (w.r.t. () solution of C. For all x 2 varsðCÞ, there exists t 2 stðCÞ n varsðCÞ such that t' = x'.
Proof. (The proofs of the facts can be found in the Appendix) We reason by contradiction. Assume that there exists x 2 varsðCÞ such that for all t 2 T ðF; XÞ n X with t' = x', we have t = 2 stðCÞ. We show that under this condition there exists a smaller solution ' 0 of C. Let C ¼ fC 1 ; . . . C ' g and for each i e ', let r i be the target of C i and C i ' be the (ground) constraint obtained from C i by instantiating all the terms in its hypotheses and target with '. FACT 1. If x' 2 st(s') for some hypothesis s of C i (i e '), then there exists j < i such that x' 2 st(r j ').
Fact 1 allows us to define m = min {j j x' 2 st(r j ')}. Note that the constraint C m is a DY-constraint of the form S m í dy r m . Otherwise, r m would be a ground term, hence x' 2 stðr m 'Þ stðCÞ, a contradiction.
FACT 2. There exists a minimal DY-proof of S m ' ï x' ending with a composition rule ðE; Ep or PÞ. Now, we let be the replacement {x' 7 ! 0} (0 is a special constant introduced in Section 3). We will show that ' 0 2 ' is also a solution of C, which is a contradiction because ' 0 ( '. For this purpose, we have to build a proof of each C i ' 0 , i e l. For each i < m, x' = 2 st(C i '), by definition of m and Fact 1.
0 is a solution of C i . Let us show that ' 0 is also a solution of C i for each i Q m. We note first that C i (') = (C i '), because of the hypothesis that there does not exist t 2 stðC i Þ n X such that t' = x'. So, we are going to show that there exists a (DY-or guessing-) proof of (C i ') for each i Q m.
Case (1): C i is a guess-constraint S i í g g. There exists a guessing-proof of S i ' ï g. Moreover, from Fact 2, there exists a normal DY'-proof of S i ' / ; ï 0 x' ending with a composition rule. From Lemma 6, there exists a guessing-proof GP of S i ' ï g that verifies conditions (a) and (b). We shall build from GP a guessing-proof of (S i ') ï g. We replace first in GP every subtree ended by an instance (s 1 , s 2 , S i ' / g j ï 0 x') of composition rule ðE 0 ; Ep 0 or P 0 Þ by the following Binstance^of (A 0 ): (x' 2 S i ', S i ' / g j ï 0 x'). Then we apply to every term of the tree obtained, getting GP 0 .
FACT 3. GP 0 is a guessing-proof of (S i ') ï g.
It follows that ' 0 is a solution of C i .
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Case (2): C i is a DY-constraint S i í dy r i . By hypothesis, there exists a DY-proof of S i ' ï r i ', and thanks to Fact 2 and Lemma 4, there exists a DY-proof of S i ' ï r i ' in which x' is never decomposed. We can build as in the previous case a DYproof of (S i ') ï (r i ').
Ì COROLLARY 5. If C admits a solution, then there exists an equational problem of the form E ¼ fx 1 % t 1 ; . . . ; x n % t n g, where fx 1 ; . . . ; x n g ¼ varsðCÞ and t 1 ; . . . ; t n 2 stðCÞ such that ' is the unique most general unifier of E. Proof. Let ' be a minimal solution of C. By Proposition 6, for each x i , i e n, there exists t i 2 stðCÞ n varsðCÞ such that t i ' = x i ', i.e., ' is a solution of E ¼ fx 1 % t 1 ; . . . ; x n % t n g. We can permute the indexes of the variables x 1 , . . . , x n in order to have E in dag solved form, namely, such that for every 1 i < j n; x i = 2 varsðt j Þ ð 1Þ
(the x i are pairwise distinct and every t j = 2 X by construction). The opposite would mean that E has no solution, using the completeness results for the dag-based syntactic unification procedure presented in Jouannaud and Kirchner (1991) . Indeed, the only transformation rule of this procedure applicable to a system of the form of E is the Boccur-check,^and its application would mean that E has no solution.
Hence, see (Jouannaud and Kirchner, 1991) , E has a unique most general unifier = 1 . . . n where each i is {x i 7 ! t i }. Since for each i n, t i 2 stðCÞ, and hence vars(t i ) 2 {x 1 , . . . , x n }, and by condition (1), is ground. It implies that = '.
Related Work
Lowe presents (Lowe, 2004 ) a formal CSP model of an intruder capable of mounting dictionary attacks and a procedure to detect such attacks, which is implemented as an extension of the framework based on the protocol compiler Casper and the model checker FDR. We believe that our model is compatible with the one of Lowe, though the formalisms differ, and hence that our decidability and complexity results are also valid for this system. Another implementation of dictionary attacks detection is presented in Corin et al. (2003) . The authors, as we do, define the existence of dictionary attacks by the solvability of a system of constraints, but they use only DolevYYao constraints (of the form í dy ). Indeed, the guessing-constraints T í g g are encoded in Corin et al. (2003) into some DY-constraints and negation of DYconstraints. However, this gives a definition of attacks strictly coarser than our definition. For instance, the tree of the second example of Section 4.5, which is not a guessing-proof, and which, in our opinion, does not represent a real dictionary attack, is considered as a dictionary attack in Corin et al. (2003) .
In Cohen (2002) , the tool TAPS for protocol verification is extended to deal with offline dictionary attacks. The problem treated is the verification of protocols for an unbounded number of sessions, and hence it is not a decision procedure. The definition of dictionary attacks is close to the one of Lowe (2004) .
In Corin et al. (2004) , offline dictionary attacks are modeled in a general and powerful framework: the applied-pi calculus of Abadi and Fournet (2001) . To illustrate their definition, the authors analyze manually some protocols w.r.t. resistance to dictionary attacks. Applied-pi calculus is an extension of pi-calculus in which the messages are terms built on an arbitrary signature and considered modulo an equational theory E. This theory characterize the properties of operators such as encryption and decryption (like the deduction rules defining the intruder deduction abilities in our paper). This calculus allows also special processes called active substitutions, of the form {x = t}, meaning that the term t has been sent and read by the intruder but its contents are unknown, and t can be refereed using the variable x. A frame is a parallel composition of active substitutions with name restriction, denoted #n:fx 1 ¼ t 1 ; . . . ; x n ¼ t n g. Two closed (without free variable) frames #n:' and #n:' 0 are statically equivalent if, for every pair of terms u, v that do not contain the names of n, we have
In other words, the frames cannot be distinguished by any pair of terms. Offline dictionary attacks can be defined naturally in this setting: roughly, a weak secret g can be guessed from the terms t 1 , . . . , t n which have been read by the intruder iff #n:' and #n:' 0 are not statically equivalent, where ' = {x 1 = t 1 , . . . , x n = t n }, and ' 0 is obtained from ' by replacing g by a fresh nonce g 0 (the intruder is able to distinguish a good guess of g from a wrong one). This definition is, of course, more general than ours. In particular, it is not restricted to a specific equational theory. We believe however that our definition is an instance of the one of Corin et al. (2004) , for the case where E contains axioms for symmetric, public-key and probabilistic encryption, and pairing. Indeed, the DY'-proofs can be represented by terms with explicit destructors. For instance, a DY'-proof P ending with an instance of (D 0 ) is represented by d(t 1 , t 2 ) where d is an (explicit) symbol for decryption and t 1 , t 2 represent the two direct subproofs of P. With such a correspondence, the two terms u and v in the definition of (non)static equivalence represent the two direct subproofs of a guessing-proof. Therefore, we believe that our procedure can be seen as a decision procedure for a particular case of Corin et al. (2004) .
Conclusion
We have defined a formal model of intruder with both deduction abilities à la DolevYYao, extended with a representation of probabilistic encryption, and guessing abilities. The verification of the protocol insecurity in this intruder model is shown to be decidable (when the number of sessions is bounded) in nondeterministic polynomial time. One may note that our procedure is not restricted to one intruder's guess per attack. This paper gives a new complexity result and does not investigate practical issues, as opposed to Lowe (2004) ; Corin et al. (2003) : the algorithm given in this paper is not intended to be implemented as it is, because of its highly nondeterministic nature. However, the NP-completeness result of this paper should not be interpreted as the intractibility of the problem. Indeed, in this field, several security problems that belong theoretically to NP or even harder classes have appeared to be tractable in practice. Hence, we think it would be possible to implement the procedure in a clever manner in order to apply this framework on real protocols.
In this paper, we focused on offline dictionary attacks. The problem of online dictionary attacks, where the intruder uses an online exchange of messages to verify each of his guesses, is claimed to be realistic in some situations (Ding and Horster, 1995) , but its formalization needs quite a different model from the one presented here.
Another possible extension is to work on an generalization of our procedure for the definition of protocol resistance against offline dictionary attacks of Corin et al. (2004) . In Abadi and Cortier (2004) , it is shown that static equivalence of closed frames is decidable in polynomial time when the equational theory is a subterm theory (set of equations t = s where s is a subterm of t). A consequence is that protocol security against dictionary attacks, following the definition of Corin et al. (2004) , is decidable in subterms theories for a bounded number of agents in the case of a passive intruder. The extension of this result to the case of an active intruder remains a challenging open question. We believe that the techniques developed in this paper could help in that direction.
Proof. Case (a j ) We assume (w.l.o.g.) that = b 1 , 2 À and (T/g j ï 0 , s) is an instance of (UL 0 ) that does not satisfy (a). Let P 1 and P 2 be the two direct DY'-subproofs of P. Let P 1 0 be the tree obtained from P 1 by replacing the subproof of P 1 whose root is the above T / g j ï 0 by P 0 . We have a DY'-proof P 1 0 of T / ; ï u (u is the verifier used in the guessingproof P) that is clearly not in normal form. So, we are going to normalize P 1 0 in order to obtain a guessing-proof P 00 of T ï g on which we can apply the induction hypothesis. Let us normalize P 1 0 using the simplification rules of Figure 6 . During this normalization, the following instances of the simplification rules may be applied:
We have a similar rule with ðUR 0 Þ instead of ðUL 0 Þ.
We have also an additional rule for deterministic encryption. 4.
with 2 {j, +}.
DECIDING THE SECURITY OF PROTOCOLS AGAINST DICTIONARY ATTACKS
We have also some rules concerning pairing. We have omitted them because they do not bring any trouble. They transform a DY'-proof into a DY'-proof and can be treated as the rewriting rule 1.
We can show by induction on the number of simplification steps that every simplification rule is applied to a tree Q whose root is a node of P 1 and such that exactly one of the son of Q is a subproof of P 0 . This explains why the only instances of the simplification rules that may be applied are such that the set of weak hypotheses in the nodes of the upper part of the left member are empty, that is, those described above. REMARK 2. Note first that with our hypotheses ( = b 1 , 2 À is decomposed by (UL 0 )) the rule of case 1 must necessarily be applied first in the simplification sequence, and this removes one instance of rule that does not satisfy (a).
We may first observe that among the instances described above, some of them (for example, 1) transform a DY'-proof into a DY'-proof. Indeed, the simplification by one of these rules replaces a DY'-subproof of T/; ï 0 u or T / g j ï 0 u by a DY'-subproof of T/; ï 0 u. Hence, the iterated simplification of P 1 0 by these rules terminates with a normal DY'-proof N 1 that has the same target u as the initial proof P 1 . So, conditions (i), (ii), and (iv) to apply the rule Compare on the proofs N 1 and P 2 are clearly verified.
We have two possibilities. Either the iterated simplification of P 1 0 by the simplification rules has not modified its last instance of inference rule, and in such a case N 1 and P 2 verify (iii) because P 1 and P 2 verify also this condition. We let P 00 be the guessing-proof of T ï g with sons N 1 and P 2 . Or the iterated simplification of P 1 0 has modified its last instance of inference rule; hence N 1 is a DY'-proof whose set of weak hypotheses is empty, and we can apply Lemma 5. In such a case, we let P 00 be the guessing-proof provided by Lemma 5. Since N 1 contains at least one instance of a rule that does not satisfy (a) or (b) less than P 1 , by Remark 2 above, we can apply the induction hypothesis to P 00 . However, the rules of cases 2, 3, and 4 with = + may not transform a DY'-proof into a DY'-proof, because they may replace a DY'-subproof of T/g + ï 0 u by a DY'-subproof of T/; ï 0 u; hence the information about g is lost. Assume that one of these instances is applied during the simplification of P 1 0 , and consider the first application.
If the first application case is 2 (with = +), let Q 1 0 be the right DY'-proof above the instance of (D 0 ) (this is a DY'-proof of T/g + ï 0 u 2 j1 ) and Q 2 0 be the right DY'-proof above the instance of (E 0 ) (this is a DY'-proof of T/; ï 0 u 2 ). By hypothesis, these subproofs Q 1 0 of Q 2 0 are minimal, hence normal. Hence, we have a normal DY'-proof of T/g + ï 0 u 2 j1 and a normal DY'-proof of T/g + ï 0 u 2 . If u 2 j1 = u 2 (it is a symmetric key), we can apply Lemma 5 as above.
Otherwise, we can apply the rule Compare directly to these two normal DY'-proofs, since condition (iii) is satisfied. By Remark 2, P 00 contains at least one instance of rules that do not satisfy (a) less than P, and we can apply the induction hypothesis to P 00 to conclude. The situation is almost the same for the cases 3 and 4 (with = +). Ì FACT 1. If x' 2 st(s') for some hypothesis s of C i (i e '), then there exists j < i such that x' 2 st(r j ').
Proof. This is a consequence of Lemma 3 because, by hypothesis, if x' 2 st(C i '), then x' 2 st(y') for some y 2 vars(C i ) (otherwise there exists a t 2 stðC i Þ n X such that t' = x'). Ì FACT 2. There exists a minimal DY-proof of S m ' ï x' ending with a composition rule ðE; Ep or PÞ.
Proof. By hypothesis, there exists a DY-proof P of S m ' ï r m ', and by Lemma 1, we can assume that P is a minimal DY-proof of S m ' ï r m '. If P contains a node labeled by S m ' ï x', then it is the root of a minimal subproof as expected. This proof indeed ends with a composition rule: otherwise, by minimality of P, we would have an occurrence of x' as a subterm of S m ', which contradicts the definition of m by Fact 1.
We show now that P necessarily contains one node labeled by S m ' ï x'. Assume that P contains no such node. We will construct recursively a path in P, from the root up to one leaf, every node of which is labeled by S m ' ï u such that x' 2 st(u), and we shall show in parallel that the existence of such a path conducts to a contradiction.
By definition of m, the condition x' 2 st(r m ') is true for the root of P, which is labeled by S m ' ï r m '. Assume that this condition is also true for each node of(a prefix of) a path labeled by S m ' ï u 0 , . . . , S m ' ï u k , with u 0 = r m ', and let us consider the sons of s = S m ' ï u k is P: Y If s has 1 son s 1 and (s 1 , s) is an instance of ðULÞ or ðURÞ, then u k is a subterm of the target of s 1 , hence also x', and we let s 1 be the next node of the path.
Y If s has 2 sons s 1 , s 2 and (s 1 , s 2 , s) is an instance of ðDÞ, then u k is a subterm of the target of s 1 or s 2 (say, s 1 ), hence also x', and we let s 1 be the next node of the path.
Y If s has 2 sons s 1 , s 2 and (s 1 , s 2 , s) is an instance of ðPÞ or ðEÞ. By hypothesis, we have x' m u k since we have assume that P contains no such node. So, x' is a strict subterm of u k , and it is also a subterm of the target of one of s 1 and s 2 (say, s 1 ). Hence, we can let s 1 be the next node of the path. Y applying to every term of the tree obtained, getting GP 0 .
Note that the tree GP 00 obtained is not a proof (since x' does not belong to S i '). The weak hypotheses are left untouched by because x' 6 2 stðGÞ. We can show that the tree GP 0 we have obtained is a guessing-proof of (S i ') ï g. We show first that in the two sons GP 1 0 and GP 2 0 of GP 0 , for every node labeled by s We have shown that GP 1 0 and GP 2 0 are both DY'-proofs. Condition (1) of the rule (Compare) of Figure 5 is ensured, and conditions (2)Y(4), for GP, are preserved in the construction of GP 0 . So, we have a guessing-proof GP 0 of (S i ') ï g. Ì
